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Between 1995 and 1998, a striking feature of the plant biotechnology industry 
structure was its increasing concentration, accomplished primarily through mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The consolidation in the vertically integrated seed, biotechnology 
and chemical markets resulted in concentration in specific output and innovation markets. 
Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga (2000) report that in 1998, Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-
Bred had, respectively, a market share of 15% and 39% of the U.S. seed corn market, and 
24% and 17% of the soybean seed market. The cottonseed market is essentially 
controlled by Delta and Pine Land (with a 71% market share) and Stoneville (with a 16% 
market share) (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). Brennan, Pray and Courtmanche 
(2000) provide preliminary evidence of concentration in the plant biotechnology R&D 
market. Using firm level data on field trials of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in 
the U.S., they construct a four firm concentration ratio for innovation in plant 
biotechnology. In 1998 the top four firms conducted 87% of all field trials, which 
declined to 63% in 1995 and then rose to reach a high of 79% in 1998 (Brennan, Pray and 
Courtmanche, 2000). Whereas the evidence of concentration in the plant biotechnology 
industry is compelling its implication on output, innovation and market performance is 
somewhat ambiguous 
The effect of different market structures on economic performance and social 
welfare is a key issue for market economies. Increase in market concentration raises 
concerns that the market power associated with monopolistic (and oligopolistic) behavior 
will result in static allocative inefficiencies. Schumpeter (1934) argued that a few firms 
were more likely efficiently to develop and employ more advanced technology than a 
competitive industry. Formal models of firms’ innovation-seeking behavior have 
evolved, that have either confirmed or refuted the so-called ‘Schumpeterian tradeoff.’
1 
Similar to the mixed theoretical results, the findings of the vast empirical literature on the 
Schumpeterian tradeoff are mixed and ambiguous as no obvious relationship between 
industrial concentration and R&D performance emerges from the data. 
                                                 
1 For a review of this literature see Kamien and Schwartz (1982) or van Cayseele (1998). Among the many 
writers who subscribe to Schumpeterian are Kamien and Schwartz (1982). The claim has been challenged 
by Arrow (1962) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). 
  2In this paper we take a long-run perspective on product innovation in 
biotechnology research and explore how the incentives to innovate for firms are shaped 
by two features of the ag-biotech R&D market. The highly concentrated upstream market 
(the R&D market) and a competitive downstream market, suggests that firm’s R&D 
decisions are a consequence of the demand for the R&D output (or farmer’s input) and 
the strategic interaction with other firms in the R&D market. A second feature is the 
observed cyclical nature of concentration and R&D effort in the ag-biotechnology that 
has been reported by Oehmke et. al. and Kaliatzandonakes and Hayenga. Industry 
concentration seems to move pro-cyclically with M&A activity (Oehmke et al.).  Since 
M&A activity has increased dramatically over the past four years, concerns about 
continued increases in R&D industry concentration arise (Brennan, Pray and 
Courtmanche). Oehmke et. al. showed that depending on the level of productivity 
increase generated by the innovation, the level of R&D may decrease or exhibit cyclical 
behavior, but in either case, the industry becomes more concentrated.  The research issue 
than is to examine how concentration will affect the rate of innovation in the long run? 
However any analysis of the long-run relationship between innovation and market 
structure requires that the mechanism of how the demand for an innovation by a farmer 
drives the research effort of the R&D firm be understood. If in the long run, with free 
entry and exit, the profits of the innovating firm’s are assumed to be zero, do incentives 
for R&D exists? In this paper we show that this question can be answered in the 
affirmative, which suggests that the nature of market structure (in the short run) may be 
moot, as in the long run productivity increasing innovations will occur in spite of the 
cyclical nature of concentration and innovation. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 
presents the simulation and discussion and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theoretical  Model 
This analysis is conducted in a vertical relationship framework.  There are two 
successive stages in the vertical production-distribution chain for a biotechnology 
innovation (for example a biotech seed)  .  The upstream stage of this vertical chain 
  3consists of the suppliers of the innovation (R&D firms), while the downstream stage 
consists of the users of the innovation (i.e., farmers) 
R&D firms (“seed suppliers” from here onwards) incur research and development 
(R&D) cost in their effort to produce a better or improved version of bio-tech seed.  
Consumers of the innovation (“farmers” from here onwards) see the price of the bio-tech 
and make their purchasing decisions.  It is assumed that the better the quality of bio-tech 
seed (in terms of its efficacy, etc.), the more it is demanded by farmers.  It is also 
assumed that this improvement in the quality of the bio-tech seed is directly proportional 
to the amount of R&D investment made by the bio-tech firms to produce a better quality 
bio-tech seed. 
The research question that we address in this paper is whether demand for bio-
tech seed gets translated into investment in R&D by bio-tech firms?  This is not an easy 
question to answer and we make several simplifying assumptions (for this article) on our 
way to answer that question.  Note that such assumptions will be relaxed in the future 
(see the Conclusion section for details).  
Our assumptions include, (a) instead of individual firm behavior, we consider an 
aggregate bio-tech seed industry behavior, (b) similarly, we consider an aggregated 
farmers’ behavior, (c) we assume that the bio-tech firms are operating in the long-run and 
(d) the R&D investment is considered as a lump-sum cost, i.e., something like fixed costs  
The upstream bio-tech industry’s objective function is given by -  
(1)         max ( , )
Bio qz P q c q z Π= − −
where   is the price of bio-tech seed per unit (charged by the bio-tech firms and paid by 
farmers),   is the amount of bio-tech seed produced by the bio-tech industry in a given 
year,   is the marginal cost (constant) of producing an unit of bio-tech seed, and   is the 
lump-sum investment in R&D by the bio-tech seed industry in order to produce better 
quality seed, and  .  We assume that  ,   and  .  Note investments in R&D 
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In the long run, the input demand for the biotech product is derived as follows 
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where, v = amount of bio-tech seed demanded by farmers which equals to the amount of 
bio-tech seed produced by the seed suppliers, ie.,  v
1
. 1 Q =  Similarly,  = per unit price 
bio-tech seed paid by farmers which equals the per unit price charged by the seed 
suppliers, i.e.,    From equation (2), we obtain the price for bio-tech seed as 
follows: 
1 w
. 1 P w =
(3)   Pw   11 (/ ) c z v == +
The downstream farmers’ conditional input demand for the bio-tech seed is given by 
(4)      ),   ,   , (       2 1 1 Y w w f v =
where,   = per unit price paid by farmers for non-seed inputs, e.g., pesticides, and  2 w Y = 
aggregate farm output, and Y where   = amount of non-seed input used by 
farmers.  We assume that for a given amount of 
),   , (       2 1 v v f = 2 v
Y , inputs   and v  are substitutes, i.e., 
an increase in the use of one would result in a decrease in the use of the other. 
1 v 2
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for farmer’s output, we can 































Substituting equation (3) for  and solving for v  and   (assume  1 w 1 2 v 0.5 α = ), we obtain, 
 





























Equation (7) yields the amount of bio-tech seed demanded by farmers and can be written 
in its generic form as follows: 
(9)    11 2 =   ( ,  , , , ), vfw wY z c
that is, bio-tech seed demand is a function of farmers’ input prices (because bio-tech seed 
is substitutable with farmers’ other non-seed input), farm output, R&D investment 
(impacts the demand for bio-tech seed by improving quality of bio-tech seed), and bio-
tech firms’ cost of production (which impacts the price of bio-tech seed,  ).  1 w
It is clear from equation (9) that although farmers’ only see the price of bio-tech 
seed and use their knowledge of seed quality to purchase such seed, their decision to 
purchase influences the R&D investment by bio-tech firms.  Thus, through equation (9), 
we are able to establish a relationship between farmers’ demand for bio-tech seed and 
R&D investment by bio-tech firms.  Now, to address the question as to how farmers’ 
demand for biotech seed influences R&D investment by biotech firms, we resort to 
comparative static analysis.  We use equations (7) to address this question.  In addition, 
we also explore the impact of an increase in competing input prices on seed demand as 
well as other variables of economic interest.   























w cw y z
∂
=>
∂ + , 
 







cc w y z vz





























2 4 Fc w y =+ z . 
 
  From equation 10, we note that the input demand for the biotech seed with respect 
to R&D is ambiguous.  At low levels of R&D, input demand for the biotech seed is 
decreasing but with increasing levels of research, the demand is increasing. Our 
simulation (Table 1) however suggests that R&D decreases the demand for biotech seed 
for a large range of research levels. Our interpretation of this result is that R&D increases 
the productivity of the input and therefore farmers decrease its per unit use. On the other 
hand research unambiguously decreases the need for the substitute as the productivity of 
the other input has increased. Our comparative results also shows, as per standard theory, 
the demand for biotech input increases as the price of the substitute increases.  Simulation 
analysis was conducted to test our model. For this purpose, we assume ad-hoc values for 
various variables that are present in equations (7) and (8).  Note that regardless of the ad-
hoc nature of the values assumed for simulation, the robustness of the model presented 
earlier is sustained.    
 
III. Simulation Results 
We summarize the simulation and comparative static results as follows: 
  7•  Demand for biotech innovation is decreasing with increasing research as well as 
with increasing marginal cost of production. It is increasing with increasing 
output and a rise in the price of the substitute. 
•  Price of the biotech seed is increasing with higher research and increasing 
marginal cost. The price of biotech seed is decreasing with increasing output and 
price of the substitute. 
•  The demand for the substitute is increasing with higher amounts of research 
(comparative static result shows otherwise), increasing in the marginal cost of 
production of the biotech seed, and final output. It is however decreasing in own 
price. 
 
Table 1: Simulation Results 
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  8IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
  In this paper we have made a modest effort to examine the relationship between 
the farmer’s demand for a biotech seed and how that demand affects the incentive to 
innovate at the firm level. We have taken a long run perspective to examine this 
relationship and understand the implication of the Schumepeterian tradeoff in the long 
run. Given our long-run assumption in the model presented here, we plan to develop a 
more realistic model of the bio-tech seed industry which will capture strategic oligopoly 
behavior.  However, without a functional form for  as a function of farm demand for 
biotech seed, i.e.,  , it is mathematically not possible to solve for market clearing 
solutions (we tried).  We hope to study this issue of functional form and solve this 
problem over the summer.  This will also cure the problem of our current assumption of 
R&D as lump sum cost to the biotech firms and would allow us to develop a more 
realistic model of R&D investment.  Once the issue of functional form is resolved, we 
hope to revise this article and report new results.  We welcome suggestions and 
comments from the readers and offer our thanks in advance. 
z
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